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A SECOND OPINION ON PHARMACEUTICAL
REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS: WHY
ACTAVIS MISSED THE MARK
Alex Galvan1
INTRODUCTION
On December 7, 2012, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
sported a grin from ear-to-ear. 2 For years, the FTC unabashedly
shopped and hopped federal circuits in hopes of creating a split
regarding the application of antitrust law to reverse payment
settlements between brand-name drug manufacturers and generic
drug manufacturers.3 Over the years, the FTC has been the recipient
of numerous judicial gut checks as the independent agency sought to
formally denigrate the use of reverse payment settlements. 4
Undaunted by previous losses, the FTC directly challenged many
reverse payment settlements, while filing amicus briefs in suits
brought by private entities challenging the same types of

1. J.D. Candidate, 2014, Georgia State University College of Law. Thanks to Monica, Sergio, and
Vanessa Galvan for their encouragement and support throughout the writing process. Special thanks to
Professor Jessica Gabel, Meg Buice, and Martin Minschwaner for their hard work, dedication, and
insight throughout this process.
2. See FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 787, 787 (2012) (granting certiorari).
3. See, e.g., FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 2d 21, 30 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[T]he Commission is
rather openly shopping for a circuit split on the issue of reverse-payment Hatch-Waxman
settlements . . . .”) (footnote omitted). In a statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee, then-FTC
Commissioner Jon Leibowitz stated that “[i]t is a matter of public knowledge that [the FTC is] looking
to bring a case that will create a clearer split in the circuits and encourage the Supreme Court to resolve
this issue.” Paying Off Generics to Prevent Competition with Brand Name Drugs: Should It Be
Prohibited?: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. 8 (2007) [hereinafter Leibowitz]
(statement of Hon. Jon Leibowitz, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission).
4. E.g., Cephalon, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 2d at 30; Edward Wyatt, For Big Drug Companies, a
Headache Looms, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2012, at B1 (noting that the FTC unsuccessfully waged war
against reverse payment settlements for more than a decade until the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in
Schering-Plough). A reverse payment settlement, for the purpose of this Note, is the result of a patent
infringement suit filed by a brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturer against a would-be generic
competitor. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2012). A sizeable payment is made
to the alleged infringer (the generic manufacturer) and, in return, the alleged infringer agrees to stay out
of the market for a specified period of time. Id. For a detailed discussion of reverse payment settlements,
see infra Part I.A.
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settlements. 5 The FTC, alongside various members of the
pharmaceutical industry, fought ardently to curtail this “new way of
doing business.”6 According to FTC Commissioner Jon Leibowitz, if
left unfettered, these reverse payment settlements will delay the entry
of generic pharmaceuticals into the market and drive up the cost of
prescription drugs, unhinging the results of legislation like the HatchWaxman Act, which successfully decreased the cost of many
prescription drugs.7
On July 16, 2012, the Third Circuit granted the FTC’s wish.8 In a
startling decision, the court held the existence of reverse payment
settlements was prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of
trade.9 The Third Circuit created a split between itself and at least
three other federal circuits. 10 As a result of the Third Circuit’s
5. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005); Cephalon, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 2d
at 30; Brief for Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants and Urging Reversal,
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10-2078, 10-2077, 10-2079); Corrected
Brief of Amicus Curiae Federal Trade Commission in Support of Appellants and Urging Reversal, In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (No. 2008-1097); Brief of
Amicus Curiae Federal Trade Commission in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Petition for Panel
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, Joblove v. Barr Labs., Inc. (In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.),
466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2005) (No. 03-7641); Brief Amicus Curiae of Federal Trade Commission in
Support of Rehearing En Banc, Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG (In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.), 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 05-2851 & 05-2852).
6. Leibowitz, supra note 3, at 8. Commissioner Leibowitz notes that “just before Schering and
Tamoxifen, there were no such payments. Just after these decisions, it appears to be the new way of
doing business.” Id. He goes on to say that it will not
be hard to predict what will happen if nothing changes. There will be more and more of
these settlements with later and later entry dates. No longer will generic companies vie to
be the first to bring a drug to market. Instead, they will vie to be the first to be paid not to
compete.
Id. (emphasis added).
7. Id. at 7. (“If these decisions are allowed to stand, drug companies will enter into more and more
of these agreements, and prescription drug costs, which slowed in 2005 after years of precipitous
growth, will begin to rise again.”). See Hatch-Waxman Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012); Anticompetitive
Patent Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Benefits of a Legislative Solution: Hearing
Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. 1–2 (2007) [hereinafter Anticompetitive Patent Settlements]
(prepared statement of the Federal Trade Commission) (“Generic drugs play a crucial role in containing
rising prescription drug costs by offering consumers therapeutically-identical alternatives to brand-name
drugs at a significantly reduced cost. To speed market entry of generic drugs, and to ensure that the
benefits of pharmaceutical innovation would continue, in 1984 Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman
Act.”).
8. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012).
9. Id.; Saranac Hale Spencer, AstraZeneca Faces Class Action Suit Over Nexium Drug, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 28, 2012, at 1.
10. Compare In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 218 (“[W]e reject the scope of the patent test.
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opinion, parties to the reverse payment settlement filed a petition for
certiorari to the Supreme Court. 11 The Court granted certiorari in
three reverse payment settlement cases, but only published an
opinion in FTC v. Actavis.12 While it seems that the FTC won the day
at the Supreme Court, the agency did not come out unscathed. 13
Instead of adopting the stringent and necessary level of scrutiny
proposed by the FTC and the Third Circuit, the Court reversed and
remanded the cases to be reanalyzed under a watered-down antitrust
framework.14
This Note examines both the split among federal circuit courts
regarding which test courts should use to determine if a reverse
payment settlement violates antitrust law and also examines the
Supreme Court’s recent opinion in FTC v. Actavis. Part I dissects
applicable law and legislative history surrounding the current split.15
Part II discusses the seminal cases represented in the split and
analyzes the various tests adopted by each of the courts.16 Part III
presents the Supreme Court’s decision in FTC v. Actavis.17 Finally,
Part IV explains why the Supreme Court’s Actavis decision missed
the mark by failing to enable lower courts to review reverse payment

In its place we will direct the District Court to apply a quick look rule of reason analysis based on the
economic realities of the reverse payment settlement rather than the labels applied by the settling
parties.”), with In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(aligning itself with the Eleventh Circuit), Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th
Cir. 2005) (“[T]he proper analysis of antitrust liability requires an examination of: (1) the scope of the
exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to which the agreements exceed that scope; and (3)
the resulting anticompetitive effects.”), Joblove v. Barr Labs., Inc. (In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust
Litig.), 466 F.3d 187, 212 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[S]imply because a brand-name pharmaceutical company
holding a patent paid its generic competitor money cannot be the sole basis for a violation of antitrust
law, unless the exclusionary effects of the agreement exceed the scope of the patent’s protection.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted), and Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1310
(11th Cir. 2003) (“When the exclusionary power of a patent is implicated, however, the antitrust
analysis cannot ignore the scope of the patent exclusion.”).
11. Merck & Co. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed,
2012 WL 3645102 (U.S. Aug. 24, 2012). (No. 12-245).
12. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
13. Id. at 2237.
14. Id. at 2238.
15. See infra Part I.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part III.
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settlements with the level of antitrust scrutiny necessary to combat
these harmful settlement agreements.18
I. PATIENT HISTORY: A LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL BACKGROUND OF
REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS
A. The Symptoms: An Overview of Pharmaceutical Reverse Payment
Settlements
When the manufacturer of a generic drug wishes to debut that drug
on the market, the manufacturer must notify the brand-name patent
holder that a generic medication will soon be released. 19 This
notification is required if a generic manufacturer intends to expedite
FDA approval under the Hatch-Waxman Act.20 After receiving this
notice, many brand-name patent holders file patent infringement
claims against their would-be generic competition.21 Many of these
claims are resolved through settlements.22 At this juncture, according
to the FTC, some of these settlements begin to skirt, if not completely
contravene, the Sherman Act and established antitrust principles.23
Often, particularly in the most nefarious of these settlement
agreements, the brand-name patent holder will pay the generic
manufacturer—the alleged infringer—to withdraw its patent
challenge and to keep their generic product out of the market for an
extended period of time.24 These agreements are often referred to as
reverse payment settlements, “exclusion agreements,” or, more
colloquially, pay-for-delay settlements.25 As the FTC became aware
of this new phenomenon, the agency grew wary of the ramifications
these reverse payment settlements could have on the availability of

18. See infra Part IV.
19. Hatch-Waxman Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii)(B)(iii) (2012); see infra Part. I.C.
20. Hatch-Waxman Act § 355(j); see infra Part. I.C.
21. Leibowitz, supra note 3, at 8.
22. Id. (noting that between fiscal years 2004 and 2006 there were forty-eight patent infringement
settlements stemming from the Hatch-Waxman Act).
23. Anticompetitive Patent Settlements, supra note 7, at 1–2; Leibowitz, supra note 3, at 2–3.
24. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2012).
25. Id.; Leibowitz, supra note 3, at 7 (referring to pay-for-delay settlements as “pernicious”).
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affordable generic pharmaceuticals. 26 In response to this problem,
Congress passed the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003, which included amendments to the
existing Hatch-Waxman Act.27 The amendments required that parties
wishing to enter into patent infringement settlements, as described
above, notify and file the agreements with the FTC and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) for review.28
After the passage of the amendments to Hatch-Waxman, the FTC
was ready to dole out tough medicine to those pharmaceutical
companies seeking to avoid competition.29 The pharmaceutical world
would soon learn, however, that the FTC was playing with nothing
more than placebos and, when it came to restricting reverse payment
settlements, the agency was powerless.30 That is, until, December 7,
2012.31
B. Antitrust Antibiotics: The Sherman Act
In passing the Sherman Act in 1890, Congress empowered itself to
address two serious issues facing the country: monopolization and
restraint of trade or commerce.32 The purpose of the Sherman Act is
26. See S. REP. NO. 107-167, at 4 (2002) (“The Federal Trade Commission reports that some firms
are exploiting [the Paragraph IV certification] by entering into secret deals to allow a maker of the
generic drug to claim the 180-day grace period in order to block other generic drugs from entering the
market, while at the same time getting paid by the brand name manufacturer for withholding sales of the
generic version.”).
27. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 139A, 223, 4980G; 42 U.S.C. §§ 299b-7, 1395b-8, 1395b9, 1395w-3a, 1395w-3b, 1395w-27a, 1395w-29, 1395w-101 to -104, 1395w-111 to -116, 1395w-131 to
-134, 1395w-141, 1395w-151, 1395w-152, 1395cc-3, 1395kk-1, 1395zz, 1395hhh, 1396u-5).
28. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 204. The FTC and DOJ share responsibility for civil
enforcement of antitrust laws. Albert A. Foer, United States of America, in COMPETITION REGIMES IN
THE WORLD—A CIVIL SOCIETY REPORT 622 (Pradeep S. Mehta ed., 2006).
29. Leibowitz, supra note 3, at 8 (“[F]or fiscal year 2004 and the early part of fiscal year 2005, none
of the nearly 20 agreements reported between brands and generics contained both a payment from the
brand and an agreement by the generic to defer entry. . . . But data from fiscal year 2006 [after two
federal appellate courts ruled reverse payment settlements were not prima facie evidence of antitrust
violations] is far more disturbing.”) (emphasis added).
30. After the courts in Schering and Tamoxifen ruled in favor of reverse payment settlements, “half
of all settlements, 14 out of 28, involve[d] some form of compensation to the generic and an agreement
by the generic not to market its product for a period of time.” Id.
31. See supra INTRODUCTION.
32. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1(a) (2012) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
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to “preserv[e] free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.”33
Under the Act, there are two basic types of violations: per se
violations and violations of the rule of reason.34 Per se violations are,
on their face, so injurious to competition that there is no need for
significant inquiry into the facts of a particular contract or deal.35 To
grapple with agreements that cannot be so easily deemed per se
violations, the rule of reason approach takes into account the
restrictive nature of agreements and further analyzes the agreement’s
effect on competition.36 The Supreme Court noted that it is essential
to determine whether the agreement merely regulates and benefits the
industry, or whether the agreement is injurious to competition within
the industry.37 As a result, rule of reason violations are characterized
as such only after an assessment of the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the agreement.38 Factors of the inquiry include: (1) the
nations, is declared to be illegal.”); EARL W. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 125–26 (1980) (“The
Act’s formal title, ‘An Act to Protect Trade and Commerce Against Unlawful Restraints and
Monopolies,’ well summarizes Congress’ remedial objective.”); Foer, supra note 28, at 621–22 (stating
that the FTC and the DOJ jointly enforce the Sherman Act in civil courts while the DOJ is solely
responsible for criminal prosecutions). See generally Kenneth Ewing, Private Anti-Trust Remedies
Under U.S. Law, 1 CROSS-BORDER: COMPETITION 87 (2007) (explaining that private rights of action are
also available under the Sherman Act).
33. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (“[The Sherman Act] rests on the premise
that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic
resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same
time providing an environment conductive to the preservation of our democratic political and social
institutions.”).
34. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 457–58 (1986); KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST
LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY & COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 113–16 (2003); THOMAS V. VAKERICS,
ANTITRUST BASICS § 1.03 (2011).
35. Per se unlawful conduct is that which has been found to have a “‘pernicious effect on
competition’” and “‘lack[s] . . . any redeeming virtue.’” Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 58 (1977) (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)). For examples of per
se unlawful conduct, see Transource Int’l, Inc. v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 725 F.2d 274, 280 (5th Cir. 1984)
(finding agreements not to compete between future and current competitors per se unlawful) and Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984) (noting
horizontal price-fixing as per se unlawful).
36. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“[T]he legality of an
agreement . . . cannot be determined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every
agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very
essence.”).
37. Id. The regulatory effect of the restraint will be weighed against any negative effects it may have
on competition. Id. A regulation, while it may appear to restrain competition, may actually create
efficiency within the particular industry. See id.
38. Id.
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facts relevant to the particular industry or business at issue; (2) the
condition of the industry or business before and after the alleged
restraint; (3) the specific characteristics of the restraint in question
and potential ramifications, either “actual or probable.”39
C. Generics Work Just as Well: The Hatch-Waxman Act
As prices for pharmaceuticals skyrocketed, Congress stepped in
through the Hatch-Waxman Act. 40 Through Hatch-Waxman,
Congress sought to remedy this problem by removing many of the
hoops a generic manufacturer would have to jump through to break
into the pharmaceutical market with its significantly cheaper
product.41 In so doing, Congress sought to increase access to generic
medications and encourage brand-name pharmaceutical companies to
lower their prices through economics. 42 Congress achieved this by
39. Id. (“The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.”). The Supreme Court also
encourages lower courts to look at the relative intent of the parties and the purpose of the restraint. Id.
For example, in Board of Trade, the Chicago Board of Trade enacted a Call Rule, which
regulated board members buying or selling orders of grain after the close of business. Id. at 237. At the
close of the call session and according to the new rule, the Board set the price of grain to be sold during
off time. Id. In effect, no one could sell grain at a different price during the off time. Id. The United
States filed suit against the Board claiming that the Call Rule equated to price fixing and was a violation
of the Sherman Act. Id. at 238.
The Supreme Court proceeded with a rule of reason analysis. Id. at 238. The Court first looked to
the nature of the rule and determined that the rule simply forced Board members to decide the price at
which they would buy grain until the next session of the Board (usually the next day). Id. at 239. Next,
the Court looked to the scope of the rule and determined that it applied only to a small portion of grain
during a specific time of day and had little effect outside of Chicago. Id. Lastly, the Court looked to the
effects of the rule, noting a list of benefits from its implementation. Id. at 240. The list included bringing
buyers and sellers together during the Call, which resulted in an “open interchange of bids and offers”
and enabled the Board to increase pay to farmers. Id. Thus, the Court determined, the Call Rule did not
violate the Sherman Act because it served to regulate and improve efficiency within the Chicago grain
market and did little harm to marketplace competition. Id. at 241.
40. Hatch-Waxman Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012); FAMILIES USA, OVERVIEW OF THE HATCHWAXMAN AMENDMENTS 1 (2002) (“A new brand-name drug generally enters the market with many
years of patent protection. During that time, the manufacturer enjoys monopoly status—there is no
generic available that can be substituted for the brand-name drug. This monopoly status keeps
competition at bay and the brand-name drug price high. When a generic version of the drug becomes
available, price competition begins, and consumers finally have access to a lower-priced alternative: The
average price per prescription for brand-name drugs is approximately three times the prescription price
for generic drugs.”) (footnotes omitted).
41. Hatch-Waxman Act § 355(j).
42. FAMILIES USA, supra note 40, at 1 (“Recognizing that generic competition in the drug industry
is good for consumers, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act in
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lessening the filing requirements mandated by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) for introducing generic drugs. 43 A
manufacturer interested in producing a generic drug need only file an
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).44 The ANDA does not
require the extensive—and often expensive—scientific research and
data usually necessary for the standard application so long as the
generic applicant can prove that their product is the “bioequivalent”45
of the already patented drug.46 The applicant is then able to use the
research and safety testing performed by the brand-name patent
holder to receive FDA approval of their generic drug.47
While Hatch-Waxman relaxed the process for seeking FDA
approval, the ANDA requires that generic applicants certify that their
proposed drug will not create friction among the patents already
contained in the FDA’s Orange Book.48 A generic applicant may file
one of four possible certifications.49 Each certification ensures that
there is no direct patent infringement. 50 It is the fourth method of
1984 to decrease the ‘time and expense of bringing generic drugs to market.’ This statute, commonly
known as the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, creates incentives for manufacturers to seek early approval
for generic drugs from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).”) (footnotes omitted).
43. Larissa Burford, Note, In re Cardizem & Valley Drug Co.: The Hatch-Waxman Act,
Anticompetitive Actions, and Regulatory Reform, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 365, 368 (2004) (“HatchWaxman . . . reduc[ed] the filing requirements for Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of
drug products that are bioequivalent to previously approved patented drugs.”).
44. Hatch-Waxman Act § 355(j)(1).
45. To establish bioequivalency, a generic applicant must scientifically establish that their generic
product performs in the same manner as the already FDA-approved drug. FDA, Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA): Generics, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugs
areDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDAGenerics/
default.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2013).
46. Hatch-Waxman Act § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).
47. Id.
48. The FDA’s Orange Book is a compilation of information regarding existing generic drugs and
forthcoming generic products. Hatch-Waxman Act § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii); FAMILIES USA, supra note 40, at
2.
49. A generic drug manufacturer can file a Paragraph I, II, III, or IV Certification. Hatch-Waxman
Act § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(IV).
50. Hatch-Waxman Act § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii); FAMILIES USA, supra note 40, at 2. A Paragraph I
Certification indicates that there is no patent data on the drug in the Orange Book. Hatch-Waxman Act
§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I); FAMILIES USA, supra note 40, at 2. A Paragraph II Certification indicates that the
relevant patent has expired. Hatch-Waxman Act § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(II); FAMILIES USA, supra note 40,
at 2. A Paragraph III Certification indicates that the manufacturer only wants approval to market the
generic after the brand-name patent expires. Hatch-Waxman Act § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III); FAMILIES
USA, supra note 40, at 2.
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certification that gives rise to reverse payment settlements.51 When a
generic manufacturer files a Paragraph IV Certification, the applicant
is assuring that an existing patent should not hinder approval by the
FDA “because the listed patent is either invalid or not infringed by
the ANDA.”52 As part of the Paragraph IV Certification, the generic
applicant must notify the brand-name manufacturer of its intent to
enter the market.53 The brand-name manufacturer then has forty-five
days to file suit for patent infringement.54 If suit is filed, the FDA is
barred from granting approval for up to thirty months.55 If a court
rules on the patent or the patent in question expires, the FDA may
approve the generic drug.56

51. Hatch-Waxman Act § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV); FAMILIES USA, supra note 40, at 2 (“The
anticompetitive practices flowing from loopholes in Hatch-Waxman relate to Paragraph IV
Certifications.”).
52. FAMILIES USA, supra note 40, at 3; Hatch-Waxman Act § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
53. Hatch-Waxman Act § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii)(B)(iii) (“An applicant required under this subparagraph
to give notice shall give notice to—(I) each owner of the patent that is the subject of the certification (or
a representative of the owner designated to receive such a notice); and (II) the holder of the approved
application under subsection (b) of this section for the drug that is claimed by the patent or a use of
which is claimed by the patent (or a representative of the holder designated to receive such a notice).”).
54. Hatch-Waxman Act § (j)(5)(B)(iii) (“If the applicant made a certification described in subclause
(IV) of paragraph (2)(A)(vii), the approval shall be made effective immediately unless, before the
expiration of 45 days after the date on which the notice described in paragraph (2)(B) is received, an
action is brought for infringement of the patent that is the subject of the certification and for which
information was submitted to the Secretary under subsection (b)(1) or (c)(2) of this section before the
date on which the application (excluding an amendment or supplement to the application), which the
Secretary later determines to substantially complete, was submitted.”).
55. Id. (“If such an action is brought before the expiration of such days, the approval shall be made
effective upon the expiration of the thirty-month period beginning on the date of the receipt of the notice
provided under paragraph (2)(B)(i) or such shorter or longer period as the court may order . . . .”).
56. Id. The issuance of notice required under a Paragraph IV Certification leaves generic drug
companies open to potential patent infringement claims. See FAMILIES USA, supra note 40, at 3.
Realizing this, the drafters of the Hatch-Waxman Act built an incentive into the regulatory framework.
Id. The first generic manufacturer to file a Paragraph IV Certification is allowed to remain the sole
provider of the generic drug for nearly six months. Id. During which time, the FDA will not approve
another generic form of the drug. Id. Thus, the only competition a generic manufacturer would face is
from the brand-name manufacturer. This is known as the “exclusivity period.” Id. The 180 days begins
either the day the generic is released, or the day that a court holds the brand-name patent invalid or
uninfringed by the generic. Id. For a discussion on the necessity of the regulatory exclusivity period in
light of the existing exclusionary power of a patent, see Yaniv Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities
in Biological Pharmaceuticals—Do We Really Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 419
(2012).
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D. Renewing the Prescription: The Affordable Care Act (ACA)
“In 2010, Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act in order to increase the number of Americans with health
insurance and decrease the cost of health care.” 57 This sentence
opened the opinion in one of the most surprising Supreme Court
decisions of the decade. 58 The Court’s approval of the ACA in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius was the end
of a long, hard-fought battle for access to quality, affordable
healthcare. 59 As one of the central tenets of the ACA, insurance
companies can choose to be placed into “Exchanges,” 60 and those
seeking to acquire insurance will be able to easily and efficiently
compare the costs and benefits of a particular policy.61 As a result, in
order to remain competitive and appeal to shoppers, insurance
providers will be forced to adopt lower, more affordable premiums.62
Supporters contend that the ACA “will give [consumers] a better
range of choices, make the health care market more competitive, and
keep insurance companies honest.”63 It is the element of competition
57. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2571 (2012).
58. Kate Uptergrove, Surprising Supreme Court Decision Leaves Many Confused About Health
Care, NEWSMAGAZINE NETWORK, (June 29, 2012, 10:48 AM), http://www.newsmagazinenetwork.com/
2012062921222/surprising-supreme-court-decision-leaves-many-confused-about-the-future-of-healthcare/.
59. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, KEY FEATURES OF THE AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT, http://www.healthcare.gov/law/timeline/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2013).
60. Exchanges will serve as online marketplaces where individuals seeking to buy insurance can
browse, compare, and research options available to them. Ctrs. for Medicaid & Medicare Servs.,
Affordable Insurance Exchanges: Seamless Access to Affordable Coverage Overview Fact Sheet:
August 12, 2011, CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-Sheets/2011Fact-Sheets-Items/2011-08-125.html (Aug. 12, 2011). Consumers will have the majority of the
information needed in order to make the best decision as to what insurance plan is best for their needs.
Id. While individual states will establish and operate the exchanges, the federal government can and will
step in to ensure the exchange is being operated appropriately. Id. The federal government will also
offer technical assistance to the states establishing exchanges. Id.
61. Ctrs. for Medicaid & Medicare Servs., Affordable Insurance Exchanges, HHS.GOV,
http://www.hhs.gov/cciio/programs/exchanges/index.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2013) (“The Affordable
Care Act helps create a competitive private health insurance market through the creation of Affordable
Insurance Exchanges.”).
62. Id. (“These State-based, competitive marketplaces, which launch in 2014, will provide millions
of Americans and small businesses with ‘one-stop shopping’ for affordable coverage. They will also
provide the sole venue where Members of Congress will get their health insurance.”).
63. Letter from President Barack Obama to Sen. Edward M. Kennedy and Sen. Max Baucus (June 2,
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Letter-from-President-Obama-toChairmen-Edward-M-Kennedy-and-Max-Baucus.
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that links the Act with the current split regarding reverse payment
settlements. Congress recently established a massive regulatory
framework pitting insurance companies head-to-head in order to
improve the healthcare system in the United States. 64 Should this
legislative shift also serve as a guiding light to both the Supreme
Court and lower courts faced with pharmaceutical reverse payment
settlements?
II. TREATMENT OPTIONS: APPROACHES TO REVERSE PAYMENT
SETTLEMENTS
A. The Scope of the Patent
1. Valley Drug Company v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals
In Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals the Eleventh
Circuit reviewed a grant of partial summary judgment out of the
Southern District of Florida in a case brought by several
pharmaceutical companies against three drug manufacturers. 65 The
pharmaceutical companies alleged that two of the agreements
between those manufacturers were per se violations of section one of
the Sherman Act.66 The question before the court was whether these
agreements were injurious to competition and thus restraints of trade
in violation of the Sherman Act.67
The first of these agreements was between Abbott Laboratories
(Abbott) and Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals (Zenith).68 Instead of
filing a Paragraph IV certification with its ANDA, Zenith sued the
brand-name patent holder, Abbott, in order to force Abbott to
64. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
65. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1295–96 (11th Cir. 2003). Valley Drug
was a consolidated class action suit brought against three pharmaceutical manufacturers: Abbott,
Geneva, and Zenith. Id. In a joint motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs alleged that the
agreements between the pharmaceutical manufacturers were per se violations of the Sherman Act. Id. at
1295. The district court granted the motion and Abbott, Geneva, and Zenith filed an interlocutory appeal
to the Eleventh Circuit. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1295, 1303.
68. Id. at 1296.

Published by Reading Room, 2013

11

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 5

572

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

“delist” 69 its claim on the patents at issue. 70 Abbott filed a
counterclaim against Zenith for patent infringement.71 Zenith sought
an injunction that would prevent Abbott from being able to claim the
patents at issue but was unsuccessful in the district court and
appealed to the Federal Circuit.72 At this juncture, Abbott and Zenith
entered into an agreement that set aside both the delisting claim and
the infringement counterclaim.73 The agreement also recognized the
validity of the patents Abbott held and acknowledged that if Zenith
had pursued the distribution of its proposed generic,74 Zenith would
have infringed upon Abbott’s patents.75 Further, Zenith agreed not to
market or sell any pharmaceutical containing the patented
substance. 76 Zenith would be held to the agreement until either a
different generic manufacturer introduced a similar product or
Abbott’s patent expired.77 In addition, Zenith agreed to refrain from
giving, selling, or otherwise transferring its rights relating to the drug
at issue. 78 Zenith also waived its right to assist any other generic
manufacturer in gaining FDA approval of a similar generic drug.79
Finally, Zenith agreed not to assist any other entity in opposing
Abbott’s patent involving the drug at issue.80
Under the agreement, Abbott would pay Zenith based on an
established schedule: $3 million upon entering into the agreement, $3
million three months later, and $6 million every three months until
69. A patent is delisted when it is removed from the FDA Orange Book. FED. TRADE COMM’N,
GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 44 (2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf.
70. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1299.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1299–1300.
73. Id. at 1300.
74. Zenith sought to create a generic form of a terazosin-based drug known as Hytrin. Id. at 1296.
Hytrin relaxes blood vessels in the bladder and prostate allowing urine to flow freely. Hytrin,
DRUGS.COM, http://www.drugs.com/hytrin.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2013) [hereinafter Hytrin
Information]. It is generally prescribed to treat the symptoms of an enlarged prostate and it can be
effective in treating hypertension. Id.
75. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1300.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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March 1, 2000, or until the agreement was no longer enforceable.81 In
the event that a different manufacturer completed a successful
ANDA and sold a similar drug, the total payments would be halved.82
Abbott also gave up its right to sue Zenith for future infringement of
the patent if Zenith behaved in accordance with the agreement.83
The second agreement at issue in Valley Drug was between Abbott
and Geneva Pharmaceuticals (Geneva). 84 This agreement, in part,
mirrored the Abbott-Zenith agreement.85 Notably different, however,
was a clause stating that Geneva would be able to introduce its drug
into the market if it received a valid “final judgment[,] from which no
further appeal could be taken,” that their proposed drug would not
infringe upon Abbott’s existing patents.86
Geneva agreed not to enter into the market with any product
containing the drug at issue in any form. 87 This prohibition would
remain in effect until either (1) Abbott’s patent expired; (2) another
company debuted a similar generic drug; (3) Geneva received a valid
final judgment that its proposed generic product would not infringe
on Abbott’s existing patent; or (4) a court declared Abbott’s existing
patent invalid.88 Geneva also agreed not to sell or otherwise transfer
its rights under the established ANDA (including the right to the 180day exclusivity period).89 In addition, Geneva agreed to oppose any
future attempt by a generic manufacturer to pick up where Geneva
left off and continue to seek approval for a similar generic drug.90
Geneva further agreed to assist Abbott in seeking an extension of the
stay on the FDA’s approval of the Geneva ANDA.91

81. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1300.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. Geneva sought to create a generic version of the Abbott-created Hytrin. Id. at 1296.; Hytrin
Information, supra note 74.
85. See Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1300.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1300.
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In exchange for Geneva’s waiver of rights associated with its
proposed drug, Abbott agreed to shell out $4.5 million every month
until either another generic manufacturer brought a similar product
into the market or Abbott successfully argued its infringement claim
in district court. 92 Conversely, if Geneva won the day in district
court, Abbott’s payments would go into escrow pending an appeal.93
Abbott maintained the right to cease its payments after February 8,
2000 if no other manufacturer had introduced a generic product into
the market.94
Overall, the lower court concluded that “[t]he essence of the
[a]greements . . . ’was to dissuade[] Geneva and Zenith from
marketing the first generic [drug of its type] in the United States for
an indefinite period [and] eliminat[e] the risk that either drug maker
would sell or purchase the right to introduce such drugs in the
interim.’”95 This characterization of the “essence” of the agreements
led to the lower court’s finding that the agreements were per se
unlawful.96 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the lower court’s ruling.97
The Eleventh Circuit noted that the lower court overlooked a
critical fact surrounding the agreements—Abbott owned a patent.98
Faced with determining the validity of payments from a brand-name
drug manufacturer to a would-be generic competitor to stay out of the
market, the Eleventh Circuit adopted an analysis of reverse payment
settlements that took into account the exclusionary power of the

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1300–01.
95. Id. at 1302 (quoting In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1349
(S.D. Fla. 2000)).
96. Id. The lower court identified three elements of the Geneva agreement that were anticompetitive:
(1) Geneva’s agreement not to market or sell its generic drug until the contract ran its course; (2)
Geneva’s promise not to sell its rights associated with the ANDA; and (3) Geneva’s promise to aid
Abbott in opposing any other generic manufacturer’s attempt to market a drug based on Geneva’s
ANDA. Id. at 1301–02. The lower court also identified three anticompetitive elements of the Zenith
agreement: (1) Zenith’s agreement to dismiss its pending delisting claim; (2) Zenith’s promise not to aid
any other company’s challenge to the patent at issue; and (3) Zenith’s promise not to market or sell its
generic drug until the agreement terminated. Id. at 1302.
97. The court reversed because a decision regarding antitrust violation would be “premature”
without looking to the specifics of both the patent and the agreement. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1304.
98. Id.
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patent.99 The court looked to see if, by entering into the agreement at
issue, the patent holder went beyond the exclusionary power derived
from the patent.100 In what came to be known as the “scope of the
patent” test, the court analyzed the patent itself and determined its
outer limits. 101 The court then examined the terms of the reverse
payment agreement.102 The outer limits of the patent served as the
boundary for the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis. 103 The terms of the
agreement were then measured against the patent.104 If the terms of
the agreement went beyond the boundaries set forth by the patent, the
agreement would be a restraint of trade and violate the Sherman
Act.105
The court parsed out the specifics of the patent to determine the
extent to which it precluded use by others and looked to see what
kind of exclusion it allowed for. 106 The court then turned to the
agreements at issue.107 Again, the court parsed out the agreements in
order to understand the extent of restraint under the proposed
settlements. 108 During both inquiries, the court paid particular
attention to the generic drug’s potential entry date. 109 The court
determined that, because the patent would preclude the generic’s
market entry until October 2014 and the agreement did not go
beyond that date, the agreements were not anticompetitive and thus
not a violation of the Sherman Act.110

99. Id.
100. Id. at 1304–05.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1305.
103. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d. at 1304.
104. Id. at 1305.
105. Id. at 1304–05.
106. Id. at 1305.
107. Id. at 1305–06.
108. Id.
109. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1305–06.
110. Id. at 1305. Based on the terms of the Zenith agreement, market entry could actually occur
before the expiration of the patent. Id.
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2. Joblove v. Barr Labs, Inc.
The scope of the patent test has been favored by a majority of
courts tasked with assessing reverse payment settlements in the
context of the pharmaceutical industry. 111 One such court was the
Second Circuit in Joblove v. Barr Labs, Inc. 112 In Joblove, Barr
Laboratories (Barr) filed an ANDA with the FDA and Paragraph IV
Certification with the brand-name patent holder, AstraZeneca. 113
AstraZeneca filed suit against Barr claiming that the generic
medication Barr intended to produce infringed upon AstraZeneca’s
patent. 114 A district court found the patent to be invalid and thus
marketing of the generic medication could proceed.115 AstraZeneca
filed an appeal.116
With the appeal still pending, Barr and AstraZeneca entered into a
settlement agreement. 117 In exchange for $21 million and the
opportunity to sell the brand-name version of the drug at issue under
its own name, 118 Barr agreed to change its method of certification
from Paragraph IV to III and not enter the market until AstraZeneca’s
patent expired.119 AstraZeneca also agreed to pay Barr’s raw material
111. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012); Ark. Carpenters Health &
Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride
Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Joblove v. Barr Labs., Inc. (In re Tamoxifen
Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 466 F.3d 187, 212–13 (2d Cir. 2006); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d
1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2005); Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1308. This Note discusses the Second Circuit’s
decision in In re Tamoxifen to illustrate the way in which courts adopting the scope of the patent test
treat reverse payment settlements and to highlight the amounts of money exchanged during these
settlements.
112. Joblove, 466 F.3d at 207. Several entities under the AstraZeneca corporate umbrella were
implicated in this case. Id. at 190. For clarity, they will all be referred to as AstraZeneca. The Eastern
District of New York dismissed a class action antitrust complaint filed by private plaintiffs against
AstraZeneca and Barr claiming that their agreements violated the Sherman Act. Id. at 196–97. Plaintiffs
appealed to the Second Circuit. Id. at 198.
113. Id. at 193.
114. Id. The drug at issue, Tamoxifen, is used to block a specific type of estrogen in women with
breast cancer. Tamoxifen, DRUGS.COM, http://www.drugs.com/tamoxifen.html (last visited Oct. 26,
2013). Certain cancers require this estrogen to grow and spread. Id.
115. Joblove, 466 F.3d at 193.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 193. Because Barr could sell the drug at issue under its own name, little incentive remained
to continue researching and developing its proposed generic.
119. Id. at 193–94. AstraZeneca’s patent expired in 2002. Id. at 194. While a Paragraph IV
Certification would require an inquiry into AstraZeneca’s patent to determine validity and the extent to
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supplier $9.5 million upfront and $35.9 million over the next ten
years. 120 If another generic manufacturer or marketer succeeded—
through a separate lawsuit— in proving that the proposed generic did
not infringe on AstraZeneca’s patent, or the patent was invalid, Barr
could proceed as though the agreement never took place.121
Like the Eleventh Circuit in Valley Drug, the Second Circuit held
that the mere presence of reverse payment settlements did not
constitute per se violations of the Sherman Act.122 The allegations of
antitrust violation in Joblove, however, presented a second question:
did the large amount of money exchanged between Barr and
AstraZeneca kick the settlement agreement into the realm of an
unreasonable restraint of trade?123 Specifically, Joblove asserted that
as a result of settlement payments, AstraZeneca would actually lose
more than it would if Barr’s generic drug entered the market. 124
Conversely, Barr stood to gain much more from the settlement than it
would have if its drug hit the market. 125 Joblove pointed to the
unbalanced consideration resulting from the large payment to
indicate a violation of the Sherman Act.126 While the court noted that
these types of settlements do raise questions, they refused to break
away from the scope of the patent test set forth by the Eleventh
Circuit in Valley Drug. 127 Thus, even though the bargained-for
consideration was questionable when compared to projected profits
and losses, because the agreement did not exceed the scope of the
patent there was no prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint
which the generic would have infringed upon the patent, a Paragraph III Certification indicates that the
generic manufacturer would only seek market entry after the brand-name patent expired. HatchWaxman Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012); FAMILIES USA, supra note 40, at 2.
120. Joblove, 466 F.3d at 194. Because the production and marketing of the proposed generic would
have benefitted not only Barr, but Barr’s suppliers, AstraZeneca also made a substantial payout to Barr’s
raw material supplier.
121. Id. Once litigation began, the plaintiffs also argued that Barr “understood” that, as part of the
agreement, it must attempt to block other manufacturers from releasing a generic into the market
through any exclusionary power it retained from being the first to file a Paragraph IV Certification. Id.;
see supra note 56 (discussing the exclusivity period).
122. Joblove, 466 F.3d at 206.
123. Id. at 208.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 212–13.
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of trade.128 In addition to adopting the scope of the patent test, the
court further noted that unless there was something inherently wrong
with the patent—for example, it was obtained through fraud—or if
the suit challenging the validity of the patent was without merit, there
is no anticompetitive element to the agreement.129
B. Quick-Look Rule of Reason: In re K-Dur130
K-Dur involved a challenge to the settlement of a patent
infringement claim filed by Schering-Plough (Schering) against
Upsher-Smith Laboratories (Upsher).131 Schering, a brand-name drug
manufacturer, owned a patent for a timed-release coating that
covered certain medications. 132 Upsher, a generic manufacturer,
wanted to create a generic version of this coating and thus began the
ANDA process. 133 Subsequently, Upsher filed a Paragraph IV
Certification with the FDA and Schering.134 Schering then filed suit
for patent infringement.135 Hours before the scheduled release of a
ruling on Schering and Upsher’s patent infringement claim, the
parties entered into a settlement agreement.136
128. Joblove, 466 F.3d at 213.
129. Id.
130. The Third Circuit’s ruling in In re K-Dur was not the first time the terms of the agreement
between Schering and Upsher came under fire. See Schering-Plough v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 (11th
Cir. 2005). As one of the agencies responsible for administering the Sherman Act, the FTC has a right to
enforce compliance by filing suits against alleged violators. Foer, supra note 28, at 622. When the FTC
caught wind of the agreement between Schering and Upsher, it filed suit against both companies.
Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1061. The case first went before an Administrative Law Judge (A.L.J.)
who ruled in favor of Schering and Upsher. Id. at 1061. The FTC appealed and the A.L.J. decision was
overruled. Id. at 1061–62. Schering and Upsher appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. Id. The Eleventh
Circuit employed the scope of the patent test that it first developed in Valley Drug. Id. at 1068. The
court reversed and the agreement between Schering and Upsher stood. Id. at 1075–76.
131. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2012). Private plaintiffs filed antitrust
suits against Schering-Plough and Upsher-Smith Laboratories. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the
settlement of a patent infringement suit between the defendants violated the Sherman Act. Id. at 208. A
district court granted Schering and Upsher’s motions for summary judgment. Id. Plaintiffs appealed. Id.
at 202.
132. Id. at 203. K-Dur is a supplement used to treat hypokalemia, a condition that causes low levels of
potassium in patients. K-Dur, DRUGS.COM, http://www.drugs.com/k-dur.html (last visited Oct. 26,
2013).
133. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 205.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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Although Upsher did not admit that Schering’s patent was valid or
that release of the generic infringed upon the patent, it nonetheless
agreed to withhold its product from the market until September 1,
2001, at which time Upsher could market a generic version of the
drug at issue.137 In addition, Upsher gave Schering several licenses
for smaller, less prominent generics. 138 For all of this, Schering
handed $60 million to Upsher. 139 Opponents of the settlement
agreement contended that Schering and Upsher used the licenses of
smaller products to distract from the true reason the $60 million
changed hands.140 During the course of litigation, opponents of the
settlement agreement alleged that Schering paid millions of dollars to
Upsher for one reason: to avoid competition.141
Beginning its analysis of the anticompetitive nature of the reverse
payment settlement, the Third Circuit outright rejected the scope of
the patent test.142 Instead, the court required that the finder of fact
look to the presence of a reverse payment settlement in the
pharmaceutical context as prima facie evidence of an unreasonable
restraint of trade.143 The resulting test is referred to as the “quick look
rule of reason.”144 The rule embodies the “economic realities” of the
pharmaceutical industry and looks at the effects of reverse payment
settlements.145 In practice, this creates the presumption of an antitrust
violation when reverse payment settlements take place between a
generic and brand-name drug manufacturer.146 The parties may then
rebut this presumption by showing that the payment was not made in
exchange for delayed entry or that the payment actually encourages
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 205.
140. Id. at 205–06.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 218. The court also discussed the fact that their ruling may have a negative impact on a
party’s willingness to settle patent litigation. Id. at 217–18. Also, they noted that their decision
contravenes a general judicial policy toward settling as opposed to fully litigating a case. Id. at 217.
However, the court noted that, even in light of the judicial policy toward settling, it is much more
egregious to blatantly ignore the purpose and history of a regulatory framework like Hatch-Waxman. Id.
143. Id. at 218.
144. Id.
145. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 218.
146. See id.
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competition.147 Because the Third Circuit determined that a reverse
payment settlement occurred between Schering and Upsher, which
resulted in delayed market entry, the court reversed the lower court’s
decision and remanded the case to be assessed under a quick-look
rule of reason.148
III. A PRESCRIPTION FROM THE HIGH COURT: FTC V. ACTAVIS
In 1999, Solvay Pharmaceuticals (Solvay) filed a New Drug
Application in order to begin the process of introducing a generic
version of a drug called AndroGel,149 which the FDA approved in
2000. 150 Solvay obtained the “relevant patent” in 2003. 151 In that
same year, generic pharmaceutical manufacturers Actavis 152 and
Paddock Laboratories (Paddock)—seeking to introduce generic
forms of AndroGel—filed ANDAs as permitted by HatchWaxman. 153 Both Actavis and Paddock submitted Paragraph IV
Certifications stating that Solvay’s patent was invalid and that their
drugs did not infringe upon it. 154 Alongside Paddock was Par
Pharmaceutical (Par), which did not file an ANDA, but agreed to
assist Paddock in funding the patent litigation in return for a share of
any potential profits from a successful generic drug.155
In turn, Solvay sued both Actavis and Paddock—two of the
generic manufacturers—for patent infringement.156 Despite the fact
that just thirty months later the FDA approved Actavis’s generic
product, in 2006 all parties settled. 157 “Under the terms of the
settlement [agreement,] Actavis agreed that it would not bring its
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. AndroGel is a topical solution that replaces or supplements testosterone in men, which results
from a lack of natural testosterone. AndroGel, DRUGS.COM, http://www.drugs.com/androgel.html (last
visited Oct. 26, 2013).
150. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013).
151. Id.
152. Actavis was formerly known as Watson Pharmaceuticals. Id.
153. Id. at 2228.
154. Id. at 2229.
155. Id.
156. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2229.
157. Id.
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generic to market until August 31, 2015, 65 months before Solvay’s
patent expired[,]” unless a third party marketed a generic prior to the
agreed upon date. 158 Additionally, Actavis agreed to promote
AndroGel to urologists. 159 Solvay reached similar agreements with
Paddock and Par.160
As a result of the agreements, Solvay agreed to pay $12 million to
Paddock; $60 million in total to Par; and a whopping $19–$30
million annually, for nine years, to Actavis. 161 According to the
companies, these payments represented “compensation for other
services the generics promised to perform.”162
On January 29, 2009, the FTC filed suit against all parties to these
settlements. 163 The district court, relying on Eleventh Circuit
precedent by way of Valley Drug, dismissed the case, holding that
the FTC’s allegations did not constitute a violation of antitrust law.164
On appeal, the FTC again met defeat. 165 In affirming the district
court, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated its mantra regarding reverse
payment settlements: “[A]bsent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining
the patent, a reverse payment settlement is immune from antitrust
attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of
the exclusionary potential of the patent.”166 Despite recognizing that
antitrust law prohibits competitors from paying one another to stay
out of the relevant markets, the court hung its hat on the strong public

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229.
163. Id. The FTC alleged a violation of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Id. Section 5 of the
Act enables the FTC to pursue and “prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2013). Moreover, violations of the Sherman Act fall within the scope
of Section 5 of the Act. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986).
164. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230; In re AndroGel Antitrust Litig., 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1379 (N.D.
Ga. 2010) (dismissing the FTC’s claim due to failure to establish an antitrust violation).
165. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230; FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012)
(affirming the district court’s dismissal of the FTC’s complaint).
166. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1312 (citing Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1307–
09 (11th Cir. 2003); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1068 (11th Cir. 2005); Andrx
Pharm., Inc. v. Elan Corp., 421 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2005)).
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policy favoring settlement of disputes.167 Capitalizing on the discord
among the federal circuit courts regarding the treatment of reverse
payment settlements, the FTC next turned to the Supreme Court.168
A. Scope of the Patent Postmortem
In its evaluation of the varying approaches to judicial treatment of
reverse payment settlements, the Supreme Court first addressed the
validity of the scope of the patent test. 169 Specifically, the Court
noted that by simply stating what the “holder of a valid patent could
do does not by itself answer the antitrust question.”170 Additionally,
the majority noted that while a valid patent does empower its owner
to exclude others, “an invalidated patent carries with it no such
right.”171 Moreover, even a valid patent will not permit its owner “to
exclude products or processes that do not actually infringe” the
patented product. 172 The Court recognized that the purpose of the
underlying litigation “in [reverse payment settlement cases] put[s] the
patent’s validity at issue,” and “[t]he parties’ settlement ended that
litigation.”173 Because of the importance of both patent and antitrust
policy “in determining the scope of the patent monopoly,” 174 the
Court held that simply because one of the parties holds a patent for
the brand-name drug the agreement is not “immunize[d] . . . from
antitrust attack.”175
B. Striking a Balance: Settlements or Competitive Marketplaces?
Next, the Court addressed the Eleventh Circuit’s use of “general
legal policy favoring the settlement of disputes” in support of its
holding.176 Although the underlying patent litigation may be costly
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See Watson, 677 F.3d at 1313–14.
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223.
Id. at 2230–31.
Id.
Id. at 2231.
Id.
Id.
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 2230.
Id. at 2234. See FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1313–14 (11th Cir. 2012).
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and time consuming, the Court noted five considerations that support
the majority’s holding.177
The Court first noted “the specific restraint at issue has the
‘potential for genuine adverse effects on competition.’” 178
Specifically, reverse payment settlements result in incentives for
generic manufacturers to stay out of the market, thereby leaving little
to no marketplace competition for the brand-name manufacturer.179
The large-sum payments to generic manufacturers and the continued
marketplace dominance of brand-name drugs benefit all except the
consumer, who must now continue to foot the bill for high-priced
medication.180
Second, the anticompetitive effects of the agreements may be
“unjustified.” 181 The Court reiterated the potential for the reverse
payment settlement to serve as an avenue for avoiding costly
litigation. 182 But, standing alone, “that possibility does not justify
dismissing the [antitrust] complaint.” 183 Based on the majority’s
holding, an “antitrust defendant may show in the antitrust proceeding
that legitimate justifications are present, thereby explaining the
presence of the challenged term and showing the lawfulness of that
term under the rule of reason.”184
Third, in the context of the reverse payment settlement, the brandname manufacturer has the power to “charge prices higher than the
competitive level.”185 The majority noted that the strongest indicator
of that power is the brand-name manufacturer’s ability to pay the
generic manufacturer to stay out of the market. 186 The Court also
cited “studies showing that reverse payment agreements are

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Published by Reading Room, 2013

Id. at 2234–37.
Id. at 2234 (quoting FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986)).
Id. at 2234–35.
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235 (“The patentee and the challenger gain; the consumer loses.”).
Id. at 2235–36.
Id. at 2236.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
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associated with the presence of higher-than-competitive
profits . . . .”187
Fourth, allowing the FTC or a private plaintiff to pursue an
antitrust claim is not necessarily overly burdensome. 188 The Court
noted that the Eleventh Circuit’s holding—while avoiding patent
litigation—”throws the baby out with the bath water[.]”189 The Court
explained that parties would not need to litigate the patent claims in
every case because “the size of the unexplained reverse payment can
provide a workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness, all without
forcing a court to conduct a detailed exploration of the validity of the
patent itself.”190
Lastly, the threat of antitrust attack against the reverse payment
settlement does not preclude settlement entirely.191 Parties would be
free to settle in a variety of other ways.192 For example, the brandname manufacturer could allow “the generic manufacturer to enter
the patentee’s market prior to the patent’s expiration, without the
patentee paying the challenger to stay out prior to that point.”193 The
Court states that while “parties may have reasons to prefer
settlements that include reverse payments, the relevant antitrust
question is: What are those reasons?”194 If it comes to light that the
reason for the settlement is to avoid competition, the settlement is
likely a violation of antitrust law.195
C. No Quick-Look for Reverse Payment Settlements
Despite the FTC’s ardent plea for the quick-look rule of reason, the
Court took a different approach.196 Looking to prior Supreme Court
precedent, the majority noted that presumptive rules, like the quick187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2236–37.
Id. at 2237.
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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look rule of reason, should only be called upon in cases where “an
observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could
conclude that the arrangements in question would have an
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”197 The Court held
that pharmaceutical reverse payment settlements did not rise to a
level of obvious danger warranting a presumptive rule. 198 The
anticompetitive effects of a particular reverse payment settlement
depend on the size of the payment, the relative cost of litigation,
whether the payment also represents consideration for other goods or
services, the industry in which the payment is taking place, as well as
other circumstances surrounding the settlement.199 Because of these
“complexities,” the Court concluded that a presumptive rule would
be inappropriate in light of prior treatment of similar cases. 200
Accordingly, while the FTC or any private plaintiff need not litigate
the validity of the patent at issue, a party alleging an antitrust
violation in the reverse payment settlement context will be unaided
by a presumption of anticompetitive effects.201
IV. TOUGH MEDICINE: A CALL FOR MORE AGGRESSIVE TREATMENT
While the Actavis ruling cannot, by any stretch of the imagination,
be termed a total loss, the Court did, however, miss the mark by
failing to hand the FTC the tools it needs to properly combat reverse
payment settlements. Of course, through the adoption of the rule of
reason analysis, the FTC is now at least able to survive a motion to
dismiss which, prior to the Third Circuit’s K-Dur ruling, proved
nearly impossible.202 The remainder of this Note discusses why the
Supreme Court fell short in its Actavis ruling and then explains why
the Third Circuit’s approach in K-Dur should have been adopted.

197. Id. (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
198. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See id.
202. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012).
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A. A “Supreme” Misdiagnosis
The Supreme Court’s rationale for refusing to adopt the quick-look
rule of reason approach is rooted in prior Court precedent. 203 In
California Dental Association v. FTC, the Court held that “quicklook analysis carries the day when the great likelihood of
anticompetitive effects can easily be ascertained.”204 Specifically, the
Court stated an abbreviated or quick-look analysis is appropriate
when “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of
economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would
have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”205
Pharmaceutical reverse payment settlements, contrary to the
Court’s determination, “meet [these] criterion.”206 These settlements
involve, as the Court states, “large, unjustified” payments from a
brand-name manufacturer to a generic manufacturer that then agrees
to refrain from entering the market, leaving no competition
whatsoever for the patent-holder. 207 This notion is contrary to the
principles of antitrust.208 If a reverse payment settlement results in a
would-be competitor delaying market entry, competition is
decreased—if not eliminated—and the consumer is left to pay the
(high) price. This arrangement between potential competitors alone
warrants the burden-shifting framework provided by the quick-look
rule of reason.
B. The Better Course of Treatment: A Quick-Look Rule of Reason
The Third Circuit discarded the scope of the patent test and instead
adopted a quick-look rule of reason test.209 The court’s decision in In
re K-Dur does not specifically detail the factors of the analysis;

203. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
204. Id.
205. Id. See also, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S.
85, 98–99 (1984).
206. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
207. Id.
208. See supra Part I.B.
209. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012).
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however, the basic premise is clear.210 The rule of reason analysis, in
the context of pharmaceutical antitrust, provides a strong base upon
which to build a test for reverse payment settlements and their effects
on marketplace competition. The analysis looks to the unique
characteristics of the particular industry as well as the actual or
probable effects of the agreement.211
1. Doctor’s Notes: Applying the Quick-Look Rule of Reason
Reverse payment settlements must be evaluated in the context of
the pharmaceutical industry. As history has shown—and HatchWaxman sought to rectify—if left unchecked, the prices of
pharmaceuticals will rise and become increasingly inaccessible
because of high costs. 212 This economic reality is true of most
products. Thus, it becomes increasingly important to look to
agreements that may circumvent Hatch-Waxman with a keen eye. If
these agreements continue to pervade the pharmaceutical world to the
extent the FTC predicts, the ramifications are clear.213 The generic
versions of these expensive drugs serve to drive down and stabilize
prices through marketplace competition.214 If these generic drugs are
kept off the market, the effects are all too predictable: expensive,
inaccessible medications.
The quick-look rule of reason would treat any payment from a
brand-name pharmaceutical company to a generic manufacturer that
results in a delay of market entry as prima facie evidence of an
unreasonable restraint of trade and a violation of antitrust law.215 This
does not, however, leave pharmaceutical companies without
recourse.216 As discussed previously, the presumption of a violation
of antitrust law is rebuttable.217 Parties can avoid FTC sanctions by
210. Id.
211. See id.
212. FAMILIES USA, supra note 40, at 1.
213. See Leibowitz, supra note 3, at 2; Anticompetitive Patent Settlements, supra note 7, at 14–20
(discussing the economic impact of the Schering-Plough and Joblove cases).
214. FAMILIES USA, supra note 40, at 1.
215. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 207.
216. Id. at 218.
217. Id.
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showing either that the money exchanged between companies was
not for a prohibited purpose—for example, delayed market entry—or
that the settlement is actually a way to increase competition.218
2. Policy Steroids: The Affordable Care Act
Congress has adopted, with the Supreme Court’s approval, a
massive overhaul of the healthcare industry. 219 To remain
competitive in the marketplace, insurance companies must compete
head-to-head with one another in statewide insurance exchanges.220
The congressional end game for the ACA was to increase access to
affordable healthcare for all citizens.221 To continue condoning these
reverse payment settlements would work against the objectives of the
ACA and impede the momentum built by this revolutionary piece of
legislation.222
The particulars of the ACA cannot, of course, be directly applied
to reverse payment settlements. However, the spirit and overall
energy of the Act—competition and increased access to affordable
healthcare—can be extrapolated and extended to legal issues
affecting the healthcare industry. Specifically, the competition
encouraged by the ACA should be kept in the back of the Supreme
Court’s mind when deciding how to treat reverse payment
settlements between a brand-name and generic drug manufacturer.
These entities are responsible for the inception, fabrication, and
distribution of medication. Although it is not the only aspect of
healthcare, medication is pivotal. It logically follows that a country
pushing for affordable, accessible healthcare would insist that the
same treatment applied to insurance companies through the ACA
should apply to pharmaceutical producers.
218. Id.
219. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). See Nat’l
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2571–72 (2012).
220. Ctrs. for Medicaid & Medicare Servs., supra note 61.
221. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010);
Elder Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 6701–03, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); Ctrs. for Medicaid &
Medicare Servs., supra note 61.
222. See supra Part I.D.
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CONCLUSION
It goes without saying that the current state of healthcare in the
United States is in flux. The adoption of the ACA sent shockwaves
through the nation. Will citizens of the United States finally have
access to quality, affordable healthcare? Only time will tell. In the
meantime, reverse payment settlements present a problem for each
and every citizen who presently uses prescription drugs, or will in the
future. While the Supreme Court, in discarding the scope of the
patent test, moves us one step closer to affordable medications and
generic alternatives, the Court could have—and should have—done
more. These agreements stand in direct opposition to the history and
purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act and contravene the spirit of the
ACA. Unlikely to overturn its Actavis ruling any time in the near
future, it is up to the lower courts to establish the guidelines for
treatment of reverse payment settlements. But the onus is not on
lower courts alone. Members of Congress have an opportunity,
through legislation and increased regulations, to stand up for the
consumer and demand, on behalf of their constituents, a competitive
pharmaceutical marketplace with affordable medications for all.223

223. Such action on the part of the legislature is not uncommon. See, e.g., ADA Amendments Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (overruling Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471
(1999) and Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002)).
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